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Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against state in-
tervention in the economy.1 We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later
work and discern an institutional thesis about which forms of state intervention and eco-
nomic institutions could threaten personal and political freedom. Economic institutions
pose a threat if they allow for coercive interventions, as described by Hayek in The Consti-
tution of Liberty: by giving someone the power to force others to serve one’s will by threat-
ening to inflict harm, in the absence of general rules of conduct. According to the logic of the
argument, welfare-state provisions are not coercive insofar as they do not allow the identi-
fication and discriminatory treatment of individuals. By contrast, we claim that a structure
of coercion is likely to emerge from the command-and-control nature of protectionist insti-
tutions and immigration restrictions currently advocated by the radical right.
Keywords: Hayek, Road to Serfdom, state intervention, rule of law, radical right, eco-
nomic freedom and democracyHayek’s The Road to Serfdom is a compelling but imperfectly understood in-tellectual statement about the relationship between economic institutions
and personal and political freedom. Hayek’s original thesis is that the fully planned
economy can set a society on a path to totalitarianism. What makes Hayek’s de-
scription unique is that the initial stages of this path require no malicious intent
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160 | Hayek versus Trumpface when replacing the market with a political process.2 This has sparked controversy
over Hayek’s position on mixed economies, which differ significantly from the so-
cialist planned economy he originally had in mind. Is he making a gloomy predic-
tion about the political prospects of the welfare state too? Is his work a calumny
aimed at discrediting any form of regulatory intervention? If Hayek is indeed at-
tacking welfare states in general, then his thesis appears to be refuted by the fact
that contemporary mixed economies have maintained political liberty.
In this article, we aim to show that the key problem of interpretation stems from
a reading of Serfdom based on isolated passages. A combined reading of Hayek’s
Serfdom and his The Constitution of Liberty establishes a more coherent argument,
which applies to today’s shifting political and economic landscape and is relevant
to contemporary debates about the role of the state and the prospects of liberal de-
mocracy. In Constitution, Hayek introduces the notion of coercion as a state in
which “one man’s actions are made to serve another man’s will, not for his own
but for the other’s purpose,”. . . when “the alternatives are so manipulated that
one is compelled to choose what the coercer wants as the least painful choice.”3 This
occurs when a person controls the environment or circumstances of another per-
son and poses options so manipulated that the coercer forces the other person to
choose a path of action that is the least painful for him and serves the coercer’s pur-
pose.4 Personal freedom (the “state of liberty”) is thus “independence from the ar-
bitrary will of another” and depends on general rules delineating a wide range of
choice in shaping one’s course of behavior according to one’s own will.5
We posit that the notion of coercion holds the key to reconstructing a coherent
argument by addressing two interpretative gaps. First, we link the notion of coer-
cion to Hayek’s core theme, the epistemic properties of institutions, which under-
pins Serfdom. Second, we establish a link between coercion that limits personal
freedom and limitations on political freedom. Hayek associated coercion with3. Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition, ed. Ronald
Hamowy, The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 17 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2011), 199.
4. Ibid., 133.
5. Ibid., 59; see also Chandran Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism (Oxford, U.K.: Ox-
ford University Press, 1989), 132; and Theodore L. Putterman, “Berlin’s Two Concepts of Lib-
erty: A Reassessment and Revision,” Polity 38 (2006): 416–46, at 419.
2. Peter J. Boettke, “Information and Knowledge: Austrian Economics in Search of Its
Uniqueness,” Review of Austrian Economics 15 (2002): 263–74, at 264; Dan Greenwood, “Facing
Complexity: Democracy, Expertise and the Discovery Process,” Political Studies 58 (2010): 769–
88, at 771–72; Dan Greenwood, “The Problem of Coordination in Politics: What Critics of Neo-
liberalism Might Draw from Its Advocates,” Polity 43 (2011): 36–57, at 42; and K. Sabeel
Rahman, “Conceptualizing the Economic Role of the State: Laissez-Faire, Technocracy, and
the Democratic Alternative,” Polity 43 (2011): 264–86, at 272.
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Aris Trantidis and Nick Cowen | 161personal freedom, which he distinguished from “political liberty” or “political
freedom,” concepts he identified with democracy.6 As a result, in Constitution
Hayekmade no system-level generalizations about how arbitrary state intervention
can unleash a path to authoritarianism, as he did in his critique of the planned
economy in Serfdom.7
Bringing together Hayek’s ideas about the epistemic properties of institutions,
coercion, and democracy allows us to suggest what types of state intervention other
than central planning are likely to have a negative impact on political freedom.
Hayek’s Serfdom thesis should neither be read as a general indictment of the mixed
economy nor as a statement exclusively limited to the case of central planning in a
socialist economy. We argue instead that Hayek offers a general warning aimed at
discriminatory state interventions in economic life that undermine the competitive
market process with coercive commands.
Based on this argument, we examine aspects of the mixed economy in order to
address the question: Which economic agendas are more likely to lead to illiberal
political outcomes? This reading of Hayek allows us to assess current policy trends
and institutional settings. We revisit the protectionist policies propounded by the
radical right, a political movement defined by an economic ideology that professes
respect for private property and capitalism but advocates extensive protectionism
and tight immigration controls. The radical right has made significant electoral
gains in Western Europe and the United States. Its influence is increasingly felt
by mainstream parties too, such as the Republican Party in the United States and
the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, which have shifted toward accep-
tance of protectionism and stricter immigration controls. This policy direction,
we explain, entails risks that can be associated with the Hayekian warning.
Hayek’s Institutional Thesis
The Epistemic-Institutional Foundations of The Road to Serfdom
Hayek’s popular book has been interpreted as a prediction about the catastrophic
effects of large-scale state economic interventions that depart from the classical lib-
eral ideals of “laissez-faire.”8 This reading comes in two distinct forms. The first one6. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 58, 168, and 61–62, respectively (see note 2 above).
See also Sean Irving, “Limiting Democracy and Framing the Economy: Hayek, Schmitt and
Ordoliberalism,” History of European Ideas 44 (2018): 113–27, at 118.
7. See Andrew Farrant and Edward McPhail, “Hayek, Samuelson, and the Logic of the
Mixed Economy?,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 69 (2009): 5–16, at 13.
8. Elsewhere Hayek repudiated dogmatic support for laissez-faire, suggesting that the intu-
ition behind the phrase only offered a “rule of thumb” about what government regulation was
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162 | Hayek versus Trumpcan be labelled the “expansionary interpretation.” It claims that Hayek’s logic of
state economic intervention can also be observed in a mixed economy and, hence,
building a mixed economy carries the risk of creating a slippery slope to a fully
planned economy and totalitarianism.9 This interpretation is popular among com-
mitted advocates of free markets as a general warning against the impact of state
intervention on political freedom. Critics of Hayek’s prediction follow this inter-
pretation and emphasize that Hayek’s predictions in Serfdom have not materialized
in the context of mixed economies.10
The second interpretation suggests that there is a quantifiable threshold after
which this slippery slope effect will materialize: a path to authoritarianism will be
unleashed after state intervention in the economy reaches a certain degree. Hayek’s
argument has been presented as quantifiable and, therefore, falsifiable. Rosser as
well asMeadowcroft andAlves deduce that the proportion of GDPmade up of pub-
lic expenditure is a reasonable measure of the intensity of economic intervention.
Meadowcroft and Alves take their cue from Hayek’s reference in Serfdom to the
German economy in the 1930s:
Where, as was, for example, true in Germany as early as 1928, the central and
local authorities directly control the use of more than half the national in-
come (according to an official German estimate then, 53 per cent), they con-
trol indirectly almost the whole economic life of the nation.11
In that view, if Hayek was correct, mixed economies in the West with relatively
high state expenditures should have already unleashed the slippery slope to total-
itarianism, but empirical reality disconfirms this prediction. Hayek’s thesis, therefore,appropriate. See Friedrich A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order, vol. 1
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1993 [1937]), 62.
9. Paul A. Samuelson, “Personal Freedoms and Economic Freedoms, in theMixed Economy,”
in The Business Environment, ed. E. F. Cheit (New York: Wiley, 1964): 193–227, at 226–27; Paul
A. Samuelson, Economics, 12th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985); and Paul A. Samuelson,
“Economic History and Mainstream Economic Analysis,” Rivista Di Storia Economica (2001):
271–89, at 305. See also Farrant and McPhail, “Hayek, Samuelson, and the Logic of the Mixed
Economy?” (see note 7 above); and Andrew Farrant and Edward McPhail, “Does F. A. Hayek’s
Road to Serfdom Deserve to Make a Comeback?,” Challenge 53 (July 2010): 96–120, at 102.
10. Stavros Ioannides, “Austrian Economics, Socialism, and Impure Forms of Economic
Organisation,” Review of Political Economy 12 (2000): 45–71, at 46.
11. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 103 (see note 1 above); also see André Azevedo Alves and
JohnMeadowcroft, “Hayek’s Slippery Slope, the Stability of the Mixed Economy and the Dynam-
ics of Rent Seeking,” Political Studies 62 (2014): 843–61, at 846; and J. Barkley Rosser, “The Road
to Serfdom and the World Economy: 60 Years Later,” European Journal of Political Economy 21
(2005): 1012–25, at 1017.
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Aris Trantidis and Nick Cowen | 163is disproven by the personal liberties and stable democratic institutions observed in
advanced mixed economies with relatively high state expenditures.
Boettke and Candela challenge this interpretation by placing Serfdomwithin the
broader epistemic program launched by Mises and developed by Hayek as part of
the socialist calculation debate.12 They argue that Hayek makes an institutional ar-
gument about the association between state intervention and authoritarianism. Fo-
cusing on the institutional infrastructure within which economic activity takes
place, they discern that the organizational logic of planning and the situational logic
of a move towards a planned economy bring instability to liberal institutions:
The logic of the situation and the logic of organization under socialist plan-
ning are such that democracy and the rule of law are unsustainable in sub-
stantive content, and the system, if pursued to its logical end, would result
in the concentration of political power in the hands of the men least capable
of constraining the abuse of power.13
Boettke and Candela also put forward an epistemic-institutionalist interpretation
of Serfdom. We develop their argument by highlighting that in Serfdom central
planning has negative effects on political liberty because the epistemic deficiencies
of that system generate conflicts as well as demands in society for strong leadership,
which then enables the rise of an authoritarian leader who claims it is necessary to
address these problems. This point allows us to further advance Hayek’s argument
in the following sections in two ways. Focusing on the relationship between com-
mands and personal liberty, we revisit Hayek’s Constitution and develop a broader
institutional argument explaining why, besides planning, economic regimes that
are characterized by political commands and administrative discretion pose a threat
to political liberty. On that basis, we will explain why the economic agenda of pro-
tectionism, as espoused by the radical right in the policy fields of international trade,
industrial development, and immigration, constitutes such a threat.
Hayek aims to dispel the belief that socialism can be achieved and maintained
by democratic means and to promote the idea that efforts to organize a planned
economy would have unintended political consequences that no socialist would
endorse.14 Hayek defined socialism as the replacement of private ownership of the
means of production with a planned economy where a central planning body12. Peter J. Boettke and Rosolino A. Candela, “The Intellectual Context of F. A. Hayek’s The
Road to Serfdom,” Journal of Private Enterprise 32 (2017): 29–44.
13. Ibid., 36.
14. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 79, 82 (see note 1 above).
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164 | Hayek versus Trumpdisplaces the entrepreneur working for profit.15 In this type of economy the imper-
sonal mechanism of the market is replaced by the “collective and ‘conscious’ direc-
tion of all social forces to deliberately chosen goals.”16 In his view, a move to a
planned economywould risk an outcome different from the intended aims of social-
ists: “instead of freedom and prosperity, bondage and misery.”17 This outcome can
be initially unforeseen and unintended, and soHayek reminded socialists of the clas-
sical liberal postulate that personal and political freedom had never existed in the
past without freedom in economic affairs.18
The organizational dimension resonates with Hayek’s epistemological thesis, as
presented in “The Use of Knowledge in Society” and “The Counter-Revolution of
Science,” on social cooperation among strangers in conditions of dispersed and
limited knowledge.19 The main tenet is that competition among entrepreneurs bet-
ter addresses this fundamental problem of knowledge.20 For Hayek and Mises, dis-
persed knowledge renders socialist planning impossible.21 Central planning stifles
the competitive process that allows effective use of dispersed knowledge in the econ-
omy.22 But the inefficiency of planning will also have serious political implications
if the pathway to a fully-planned economy entails the gradual expansion and en-
trenchment of a command system that displaces the open-ended competitive mar-
ket altogether.2315. Ibid., 83.
16. Ibid., 73.
17. Ibid., 65.
18. Ibid., 67; see also David Schmidtz, “History and Pattern,” Social Philosophy and Policy
22 (2005): 148–77, at 156; and Robert S. Taylor, “Illiberal Socialism,” Social Theory and Practice
40 (2014): 433–60, at 435.
19. Friedrich A. von Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review
35 (1945): 519–30, at 526; and The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Rea-
son, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Press, 1979). See also Peter J. Boettke, “On Reading
Hayek: Choice, Consequences and The Road to Serfdom,” European Journal of Political Econ-
omy 21 (2005): 1042–53, at 1043; and Bruce Caldwell, Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biog-
raphy of F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 241.
20. Peter J. Boettke and Kyle W. O’Donnell, “The Failed Appropriation of F. A. Hayek by
Formalist Economics,” Critical Review 25 (2013): 305–41; and Jeffrey Friedman, “Hayek’s Two
Epistemologies and the Paradoxes of His Thought,” Critical Review 25 (2013): 277–304, at 288.
21. Peter J. Boettke, “Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom Revisited: Government Failure in the
Argument against Socialism,” in Calculation and Coordination: Essays on Socialism and Tran-
sitional Political Economy (New York: Routledge, 2001), 47–65, at 49; Mark Pennington, “Ha-
yekian Political Economy and the Limits of Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies 51 (2003):
722–39, at 727; and Morris M. Wilhelm, “The Political Thought of Friedrich A. Hayek,” Political
Studies 20 (1972): 169–84, at 170.
22. Boettke, “Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom Revisited,” 49 (see previous note).
23. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 88 (see note 21 above).
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Aris Trantidis and Nick Cowen | 165On this account, planning makes it impossible to achieve consensus or a stable
majority to tackle the distributional conflicts thatwill revolve around the ends of nu-
merous planning processes. Comprehensive planning requires adjudicating among
countless conflicting values and expectations, which is beyond the capacity of de-
mocracy.24 Distributional clashes in the planned economy will create stronger de-
mands for greater and more authoritative powers for government to act on its own
responsibility.25 Ultimately, there can be a popular cry for a strong leader to fully
plan and coordinate economic activity.26 While the public will not anticipate such
a political development, once a command economy is established, it will degenerate
into political authoritarianism by the nature of the power it will assume to address
its own inefficiencies and inner conflicts. Hayek writes, “just as the democratic
statesman who sets out to plan economic life will soon be confronted with the al-
ternative of either assuming dictatorial powers or abandoning his plans, so the to-
talitarian dictator would soon have to choose between disregard of ordinary morals
and failure.”27 Serfdom describes the two interrelated processes—epistemic and
institutional: taking steps towards a planned economy that may progressively and
stealthily lead to an institutional state of affairs in which planning replaces compe-
tition and there is popular demand for strong leadership to take tough decisions in
face of the failures of central planning. What is unique about this account is that it
starts with a benevolent yet epistemically unwarranted effort to build a planned
economy and leads to authoritarianism because of the coercive nature of the powers
concentrated by the government’s strong leadership of economic affairs. Planning
produces this outcome through the combined effect of the organizational nature of
command government interventions and the situational problems of this type of
planning. Both the epistemic deficiencies of a command economy and the coercive24. Peter J. Boettke, Vlad Tarko, and Paul Aligica, “Why Hayek Matters: The Epistemic Di-
mension of Comparative Institutional Analysis,” in Advances in Austrian Economics, vol. 21, ed.
Peter J. Boettke and Virgil Henry Storr (Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Group Publishing Limited,
2016), 163–85, at 177; Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson, “Hayek, Arrow, and the Problems
of Democratic Decision-Making,” Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 20 (2002): 9–21,
at 12; Samuel De Canio, “Democracy, the Market, and the Logic of Social Choice,” American
Journal of Political Science 58 (2014): 637–52, at 639; Gerald F. Gaus, “Self-Organizing Moral
Systems: Beyond Social Contract Theory,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17 (2018): 119–
47, at 140; and Pennington, “Hayekian Political Economy” (see note 21 above).
25. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 108 (see note 1 above).
26. Ibid., 99.
27. Ibid., 158; see also 126.
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166 | Hayek versus Trumpproperties inherent in the commands themselves combine to produce negative
consequences for personal and political freedom. Hayek’s take on the logic of com-
mand and control looks at these interventions not simply as the cause of failure,
frustration, and popular unrest that could lead to a popular cry for an economic
dictator, but also as components of an economic structure which by their own na-
ture lead to increasing coercion.
The Institutional Thesis on Coercion in The Constitution of Liberty
We now move beyond the epistemic deficiencies of central planning that Boettke
and Candela have defended as central to Hayek’s argument in Serfdom.28 We em-
phasize that the epistemic deficiencies of planning and the conflicts it generates are
not the only conditions at work that pave the way to authoritarianism. To that end,
we focus on the notion of coercion that Hayek’s later work on the rule of law elab-
orated. We also establish a more general account of the coercive potential of insti-
tutions that obstruct the competitive market process even in the absence of central
planning. This potential does not merely emerge from the inefficiencies and distri-
butional conflicts that planning creates—a reality that modern democracies often
face—but is also associated with the nature of the interventions such that, when
applied on a large scale, the interventions can effectuate an encompassing com-
mand structure of economic and political relations.
Our starting point of this interpretation is Hayek’s definition of illiberal coer-
cion in Constitution as the power to force other people to serve one’s will by the
threat of inflicting harm.29 Hayek’s account of coercion is inspired by neo-Roman
scholars as submission to the arbitrary will of another person, and it has remark-
ably close parallels with contemporary liberal republican theorists.30 Illiberal coercion28. Boettke and Candela, “The Intellectual Context of F. A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom,”
41 (see note 12 above).
29. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 212 (see note 2 above); and Peter Lindsay, “Exposing
the Invisible Hand: The Roots of Laissez-Faire’s Hidden Influence,” Polity 37 (2005): 295–314,
at 304.
30. Harrison P. Frye, “Freedom without Law,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17 (2018):
298–316, at 301; Sean Irving, “Hayek’s Neo-Roman Liberalism,” European Journal of Political
Theory, July 17, 2017, at https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885117718370; see also Robert S. Taylor,
“Market Freedom as Antipower,” American Political Science Review 107 (2013): 593–602, at 597;
and Robert S. Taylor, Exit Left: Markets and Mobility in Republican Thought, first ed. (Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2017), 92. There are other republican theorists who share the same
concern with non-domination but are more skeptical of the capacity of market institutions to con-
tribute to protecting political liberty. See Steven Klein, “Fictitious Freedom: A Polanyian Critique
of the Republican Revival,” American Journal of Political Science 61 (2017): 852–63, at 857; and
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Aris Trantidis and Nick Cowen | 167is unleashed when the institutional environment is one in which an authority de-
cides what the individual does and how they do it through commands that entail ar-
bitrary discrimination.31 For Hayek, this requires someone else’s control of one’s
environment and circumstances, while personal freedom presupposes the protec-
tion of a private sphere in which individuals can determine their own actions of
choice free from such interference.32 This protection is offered by the rule of law,
which is defined in Constitution as a permanent framework that secures the private
sphere in which individuals can make their own decisions by means of rules for-
mulated in abstract and general terms to secure equality to all persons.33 Hayek dis-
tinguishes this notion of coercion from coercion under the rule of law, which is le-
gitimate “only if it is applied in the enforcement of universal rules of just conduct
equally applicable to all citizens.”34 In this article, we use the term coercion in the
sense of illiberal coercion.
In addition, Hayek uses an Aristotelian postulate of isonomy, stating that equal-
ity before the law is “the only kind of equality conducive to liberty.”35 A free society
presupposes the limitation of coercion by equality before the law. Rules must be
impersonal, general, and abstract, allowing individuals to plan their own course
of action in a protected private sphere.36 In Hayek’s conception of the rule of law,
state economic planning is an infringement of personal freedom insofar as it is
not confined to setting fixed rules under which individuals can decide how to make
use of available resources. Each instance of coercive planning involves momentary
decision making that must address various claims and interests and will inevitably
privilege some at the expense of others on an unpredictable basis. The planning au-
thority can thus discriminate between persons.37 Hayek’s conception of personal lib-
erty precludes distribution on an individual basis by a single source of authority, as
this can permit coercive manipulation and is “bound to create further demands forJohn P. McCormick, “Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Account-
ability to Popular Government,” American Political Science Review 100 ( 2006): 147–63, at 159.
31. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 164, 217–18 (see note 2 above).
32. Ibid., 71, 206, 21–12; see also Friedrich A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A
New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy (London: Routledge,
1998), 55.
33. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 239 (see note 2 above).
34. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 50 (see note 8 above).
35. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 149 and 286 (see note 2 above); see also Irving,
“Hayek’s Neo-Roman Liberalism” (see note 30 above).
36. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 72 (see note 2 above).
37. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 127–28 (see note 1 above).
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168 | Hayek versus Trumpnew controls,” pushing towards a direction in which the whole society will be orga-
nized in accordance to this principle.38
The institutionalist interpretation that we have refined here brings coherence
to Hayek’s seemingly ambivalent stance towards the mixed economy: on the one
hand, his rejection of “social justice” as a coherent and attractive goal for govern-
ments and, on the other hand, his acceptance of several forms of state interven-
tion.39 Hayek’s position rejects policies that follow the same logic of intervention
he described in Serfdom.40 It is on this basis that Hayek rejected certain types of
state intervention while accepting others, indeed against the way he has frequently
been characterized both by his critics and supporters. Potentially legitimate inter-
ventions include counter-cyclical policies to replace lost credit during a recession
(in today’s terms, expanding the money supply), which Hayek supported begin-
ning in 1933,41 and some welfare state functions that he endorsed in Constitution
in 1960 as “security against severe physical privation, the assurance of given min-
imum sustenance for all.”42 In 1973, in Law, Legislation and Liberty, Hayek clarified
the compatibility of his principles with government provision of services for a mi-
nority of those unable to look after themselves; his position was justified by moral
reasons shared broadly among citizens and as part of social insurance against mis-
fortune for the whole population:
Although the provision of such services increases the necessity of levying
taxes, these can be raised according to uniform principles; and the duty to
contribute to the costs of such agreed common aims could be brought under
the conception of general rules of conduct. It would not make the private cit-
izen in any way the object of administration; he would still be free to use his38. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 164 (see note 2 above).
39. See Peter Lindsay, “Polanyi, Hayek, and the Impossibility of Libertarian Ideal Theory,”
Polity 47 (2015): 376–96, at 381; Andrew Lister, “The ‘Mirage’ of Social Justice: Hayek Against
(and For) Rawls,” Critical Review 25 (2013): 409–44; Andrew Lister, “Markets, Desert, and Rec-
iprocity,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 16 (2017): 47–69; Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Liberalism,
Markets, and Responsibility,” Journal of Politics 79 (2017): 1329–41, at 1339; Adam James
Tebble, “Hayek and Social Justice: A Critique,” Critical Review of International Social and Po-
litical Philosophy 12 (December 2009): 581–604; and John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), 123.
40. Farrant and McPhail, “Hayek, Samuelson, and the Logic of the Mixed Economy?” (see
note 7 above).
41. Hayek, “Saving,” in Profits, Interest and Investment (London: George Routledge & Sons
Ltd., 1939), 157–70, at 164–65; and K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy against Domination (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 8.
42. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 376 (see note 2 above).
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Aris Trantidis and Nick Cowen | 169own knowledge for his purposes and not have to serve the purposes of an
organization.43
Hayek accepts that welfare distributions to classes of people formed on the basis of
shared demographic characteristics are not arbitrary insofar as “they are equally
recognized as justified by those inside and outside the group.”44 This involves pro-
visions for the weak and the vulnerable or policies offering protection against risks,
provided that the rules governing these provisions are general and abstract.45 A
welfare system differs from the command economy Hayek had in mind when he
wrote Serfdom, not necessarily because welfare policies, regulation, taxation and re-
distribution are free from epistemic challenges, but because they are far from being
functions of a command economy.46 While Hayek grew skeptical about whether
governments can confine themselves to principles preventing coercive uses of state
power,47 mixed economies differ fromHayek’s structure of coercion, which was ar-
ticulated in Constitution in 1960, at a time when Western democracies had devel-
oped their welfare and redistributive policies.
Hayek’s political thought can be understood as postulating a qualitatively nu-
anced position on the structure of mixed economies. Depending on the type and
the scale of intervention, political coercion is possible. The threshold after which
authoritarianism is a probable outcome is not simply a certain level of govern-
ment’s share of GDP, but a type of structural transformation of the economy to-
wards a prevalent nature of intervention that permits coercivemanipulation. Hayek
rejects the notion of “social justice” as a normative principle governing distributive
politics, because policy applications in the name of social justice will be coercive and
attempts to build an economy that would embody a notion of social justice will tend
towards command-and-control planning.48 This is an economic institutional sys-
tem of the type of the German economy that Hayek describes in Serfdom and is
reminiscent ofMises’s Zwangswirtschaft, a social system emerging from the contin-
uous expansion of political intervention in which the allocation of resources is43. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 142 (see note 8 above).
44. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 222 (see note 2 above).
45. Ibid., 165.
46. François Godard, “The Road to Serfdom’s Economistic Worldview,” Critical Review 25
(2013): 364–85, at 377.
47. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 142–43 (see note 8 above).
48. Farrant and McPhail, “Hayek, Samuelson, and the Logic of the Mixed Economy?,” 12–
13 (see note 7 above).
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170 | Hayek versus Trumpdecided by arbitrary political decision making despite the fact that a façade of the
market system is preserved.49
In sorting out a general structural-institutional argument, in this and the follow-
ing two subsections, we developHayek’s distinction between an economy governed
by the rule of law, which reduces arbitrariness and therefore the scope for coercion,
and an economy that, by increasing the range and intensity of discriminatory in-
terventions, becomes illiberal in the Hayekian sense. Arbitrariness becomes a seri-
ous problem when it engulfs the whole economy, as is the case in Serfdom and its
centrally planned system:
The consequence is that, as planning extends, the delegation of legislative
powers to diverse boards and authorities becomes increasingly common . . .
Constantly the broadest powers are conferred on new authorities which, with-
out being bound by fixed rules, have almost unlimited discretion in regulating
this or that activity of the people.50
There will be no economic or social questions that would not be political ques-
tions in the sense that their solution will depend exclusively on who wields the
coercive power, on whose are the views that will prevail on all occasions.51
Combining Hayek’s epistemic argument with this conception of coercion allows
us to reconstruct a general argument applicable to other economic structures.
We posit that depending on the coercive capacity of the interventions they entail, eco-
nomic institutions can undermine liberal democratic institutions.52 This allows us
to make an addendum to the organizational and situational logic developed in Serf-
dom and to discern a generalizable Hayekian warning. In particular, the notion of
coercion in Constitution clarifies the mechanism by which commands can foster
political authoritarianism and enables us to answer the question of which economic
regimes besides central planning could limit political liberties to such an extent
that the actual character of a political regime shifts to authoritarianism.53 The49. Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, trans. J. Kahane
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1951), 533; John Hagel and Walter E. Grinder,
“From Laissez-Faire to Zwangswirtschaft: The Dynamics of Interventionism,” in The Dynam-
ics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, ed. Peter Kurrild-
Klitgaard (London: Elsevier, 2005), 59–86.
50. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 120 (see note 1 above); emphasis added.
51. Ibid., 138.
52. See Boettke, “On Reading Hayek,” 1046–47 (see note 19 above).
53. Robert A. Lawson and J. R. Clark, “Examining the Hayek–Friedman Hypothesis on Eco-
nomic and Political Freedom,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 74 (2010): 230–
39.
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ogous to planning threaten personal liberty. Political coercion becomes possible
when these interventions make up an institutional structure similar to the planning
structure envisaged by Hayek, allowing political authority to issue commands that
result in society’s increasing subjection to the arbitrary will of the rulers.
The nature of this system is inextricably linked to de facto restrictions of prop-
erty rights.54 As we discuss in the next section, the notion of de facto restrictions
of property rights enables us to assess interventions enacted by economic institu-
tions and rules which, while professing respect for property rights, nevertheless
seek to determine the use of property rights on an ad hoc basis.
De Facto Restrictions of Property Rights and Actual Coercion
Is the recognition of private property sufficient to protect one’s private sphere from
coercive interventions? To better illustrate the relation between coercion and prop-
erty rights, we propose two conceptual additions to Hayek’s account. First, rather
than focusing on the presence or absence of property rights, we propose treating
property as a bundle of rights that together effectuate a private sphere for autono-
mous, non-coercive action.55 Classical liberal theorists have sometimes failed to ap-
preciate the conceptual dimensions of property rights,56 leaving classical liberals to
defend an archaic unitary notion of full liberal ownership almost by default as “that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the uni-
verse.”57 However, the traditional notion of property as full liberal ownership in-
cludes a bundle of related rights over incidents (i.e., various activities that legal
rights permit or prohibit): to possess, use, manage, derive income and capital from,
and destroy or transfer an asset.58 Two features of these incidents that define the
content (rather than the form) of private property rights are income and control,54. Boettke, “On Reading Hayek,” 1048 (see note 19 above).
55. A. M. Honoré, “Ownership,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: A Collaborative Work,
ed. Klitgaard (see note 49 above), 107–26; Daniel Attas, “Fragmenting Property,” Law and Phi-
losophy 25 (2006): 119–49; and Gerald F. Gaus, “Property,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political
Philosophy, ed. David M. Estlund (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 93–112.
56. Gaus, “Property,” 94 (see previous note).
57. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, vol. 1 (Phila-
delphia, Pa.: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1893), 393, at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option
5com_staticxt&lstaticfile5show.php%3Ftitle52140&layout5html.
58. Honoré, “Ownership” (see note 55 above).
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session and use of an asset—while having limited rights over the income. In other
cases, citizens may have the right to own a factory (possession), but they may be
frequently subject to many interventions concerning how they exercise control
over this asset (use).
This view of multiple instances of rights that constitute one’s private sphere en-
ables us to scrutinize different forms of state intervention in the economy in light of
Hayek’s notion of coercion. We will clarify the implications of diverse institutional
settings of government intervention, including the coercive potential of economic
agendas that respect property rights in principle but nevertheless propose ever-
increasing restrictions on those rights. These restrictions vary; they may affect the
income derived from property through taxation and redistribution; or the control
of property through regulation or protectionist measures.
Second, rather than assessing the typical form or source of the rule authorizing
intervention, we assess the nature of interventions as they are actually implemented.
This distinguishes our approach from Hayek’s distinction in Law, Legislation and
Liberty between general law as nomos that limits and delineates a range of permis-
sible action and thesis that takes the form of commands that instruct someone to
do something. Here we seek to address the problem that we identified when rules
take the form of general and abstract provisions but still enable commands and ad-
ministrative or judicial discretion at the stage of implementation: their implemen-
tation and enforcement can be ad hoc and largely dependent on the discretion of
the enforcing authority. We thus consider the applicability of state interventions
at all stages of implementation and enforcement, regardless of whether their au-
thorizing source takes the form of a Hayekian nomos or thesis. Even when the law-
giver does not know the cases to which the rule applies, both the administrators and
the judges—who are situated in and accountable to political networks—may be able
to isolate particular cases and decide to interpret the law differently according to
who is under judgment or to enforce it on an arbitrary basis.60
Impersonal and Partial-Discriminatory Intervention
Bringing these two additions together, we distinguish between impersonal and
partial-discriminatory applications of state intervention on the basis of their coer-
cive capacity.59. Attas, “Fragmenting Property,” 120 (see note 55 above).
60. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 227 (see note 2 above).
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identify individuals prior to the act of intervention (thereby allowing for the inter-
vener to reward or punish individual persons) and include Hayek’s planning com-
mands.61 Moreover, this type of intervention includes rules that formally conform
to the generality principle of the rule of law—setting out abstract, predictable, and
equal terms for behavior—but whose applicability can be discretionary, allowing
for discrimination at the stage of enforcement. For instance, expropriation of prop-
erty, the regulation of production, the seizure of existing profits or products, or any
form of adjudication by an authority may be determined by fixed rules, but actual
decisions may not be independent of arbitrary selection if the affected actors can
still be identified ahead of time (ex ante). Because there is personal identification
in these cases, partial-discriminatory application of state authority can be used
for the purpose of coercion in the sense described above.
Impersonal applications of state intervention, on the other hand, are impartial in
the sense that they do not enact discrimination on the individual level. These can
include laws that are explicitly designed to favor a large group of beneficiaries (the
unemployed or the retired) or an open group of beneficiaries (people suffering
from a rare disease) even if they convey a privilege at the expense of others (whether
unfairly or not in any given actor’s judgment). A policy or a law is uniformly ap-
plied to a group when it is configured in a way that is still impartial at the individual
level: its inclusion and exclusion criteria apply to everyone and its treatment of in-
dividuals is impersonal, in the sense that it does not entail ex ante identification of
individual members either for inclusion or exclusion. Consider, for example, wel-
fare distributions to groups, such as people with special educational needs, farmers,
local constituents, or pensioners. Although such policies allow for the distribution
of privileges to a group, these allocations are not partial-discriminatory in the sense
described above, because the privileges are delivered automatically to all eligible
members of the group regardless of personal identity. Even the particularized ben-
efits, for example, that U.S. congressmen may win for their constituents in order to
seek campaign support and re-election can count as impersonal if the group of ben-
eficiaries is, in principle, open and not individually fixed.62 Likewise, under a wel-
fare state, transfer payments that offer services to latent beneficiary groups are not
partial-discriminatory types of state intervention, since individuals are less likely to61. We introduce the term partial-discriminatory to distinguish it from discrimination that
can be either personal or impersonal.
62. See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 2004), 114.
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will be selected in a discriminatory way.
Impersonal applications can be amatter of either policy design or the method of
implementation. Our conception of generality here concerns the rule’s applicabil-
ity: the capacity for each intervention to apply discretionary treatment upon the
identification of the individual recipients can be more or less likely than general
application. The risk from partial-discriminatory applications resonates with Ha-
yek’s definition of coercion as one’s individual dependence on the approval of an-
other person stemming from prior manipulation of one’s alternatives.63 It differs
from the strictest “generality principle” conceived of by Buchanan and Congleton
as the standard in which political actions must “apply to all persons independently
of membership in a dominant coalition or effective interest group.”64 That would
preclude any distribution to a group unless it is neutral in the sense that everyone
has an equal chance of qualifying for it.
One can differentiate between the two types of government interventions on a
case-by-case basis by examining actual implementations, and on a theoretical level,
by examining the capacity that each policy type offers to a government for partial-
discriminatory treatment, that is, the relative ease by which a government can ap-
ply a type of policy in the form of Hayekian commands targeting individuals and
can do so in a way that does not necessarily violate any formal constitutional re-
strictions on government discretion. Given the rule-of-law limitations of contem-
porary liberal democracies, such as the United States, the type of policy agenda that
is more likely to expose citizens to the kind of arbitrary power that Hayek warns
against in Constitution and Serfdom is a policy agenda whose discretionary and ad
hoc applications have already been practiced and accepted as compatible with ex-
isting rules and norms.
For example, interventions into the income dimension of property are usually
not partial-discriminatory at the individual level. States can easily tax income by
using non-discretionary and non-discriminatory rules, such as tax brackets and in-
come levels. Higher taxes in a mixed economy mean only that a greater proportion
of income is claimed from everyone who falls within predetermined categories of
taxpayers. This reduces (but does not eliminate) the risk of discrimination at the
stage of enforcement. At times, owners of capital can be treated partially if the gen-
eral rules allow bureaucratic discretion at the stage of tax law enforcement. Similarly,63. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 223 (see note 2 above).
64. James M. Buchanan and Roger D. Congleton, Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Toward
Nondiscriminatory Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xi.
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forcement and discrimination in terms of who is eligible for treatment underMedi-
care and Medicaid, or for participation in pension schemes based on retirement
age and prior contributions.
Partial-discriminatory interventions rely on rules that allow for wide discretion
in interventions in the use or management of others’ property and activity in an ad
hoc fashion, as well as on a wide scope for interpretation at the stage of enforce-
ment. The property owners may still retain formal control and supervision over
their property but can be subjected to ad hoc applications of state intervention at
the enforcement stage and face active penalties should they fail tomeet policy-related
targets or quotas. In addition, they are more easily identified prior to the enactment
of a rule imposing what is seemingly a general restriction. In these instances, individ-
uals aremore exposed to coercion by the arbitrary will of the political authority in the
sense that the threat of intervention forces them to act according not to a preferred
course of action but to a plan serving the ends of the political authority.65
Both the type and scale of these interventions define the nature of the institu-
tional environment.Onour account, economic structures characterized by thewide-
spread application of partial-discriminatory interventions risk unleashing a path to
political coercion because the institutional setting and the actual practices that take
place within it allow for the identification and targeting of substantial numbers of
individuals. The institutional threshold here is the link between the nature of inter-
vention and the range of its application.66 Coercion becomes systemic in an envi-
ronment where exit is severely limited. This state of affairs describes the situation in
which “the alternatives before me have been so manipulated that the conduct that
the coercer wants me to choose becomes for me the least painful one.”67 Without
room for exit, people find themselves subjected to the orders and the arbitrary will
of the coercive political force.68
We transpose Hayek’s conception of coercion into a political thesis: Political co-
ercion is a state of affairs in which one’s choice of political behavior depends on the
approval of a political authority.69 This state authority deprives the individual of a
sphere of choice among alternatives bringing them to a situation in which they are
compelled to choose what the political actor wants them to choose as the least costly65. See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 71 (see note 2 above).
66. See Sanford Ikeda, “The Dynamics of Interventionism,” in Dynamics of Intervention,
ed. Kitgaard, 21–57, at 41 (see note 49 above).
67. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 200 and 207 (see note 2 above).
68. Ibid., 182–83.
69. Ibid., 71.
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176 | Hayek versus Trumpoption.70 Due to the fear of arbitrary treatment and the threat of penalties assessed
against that individual’s economic and social activities, their social and political ac-
tions can be made to serve the desires of that political actor.
Finally, the conceptual distinction between the capacity for partial-discriminatory
and impersonal applications of state intervention helps us clarify why contempo-
rary mixed economies have high levels of income claims and significant regulatory
power over sectors of the economy but retain a substantial degree of personal and
political liberty; this is due to the limited presence of partial-discriminatory appli-
cations of state interventionism. The welfare and regulatory systems of advanced
democracies mostly offer impersonal entitlements to distributions and enact gener-
ally applicable regulations. Institutional changes that expand the scope for partial-
discriminatory applications of state intervention increase the risk for political
coercion.
Policies vary in the ease with which they can be used in a partial discriminatory
way at the phases of both enactment and implementation according to how easy it
is to isolate who is affected by the policy. Observing policy implementation in the
United States, Lowi distinguishes between policies that allow for the highest degree
of “disintegration,” which he calls distributive or individualized conflict and pro-
vision, and “redistributive” policies, which, in his classification, affect broad cate-
gories, such as the business class, the working class, or the “have-nots.”71 Regulatory
policies—which comprise Lowi’s intermediate category—invoke general rules, but
their impact can be disaggregated at the sectoral level. As Lowi observes, protec-
tionist tariff policies can exhibit the highest degree of disintegration on an individ-
ual basis and, as a result, they can be prone to patronage. Tariff policies favor the
propagation of particular demands from special interests, but the structure of com-
petition for favorable policies also includes ideological debates and discussions.72
Tariff policy in the hands of different administrations in the United States after
1962 assumed the character of a regulatory policy, but questions on quotas and
subsidies for specific commodities became part of distributive politics.73 Lowi’s ob-
servation of the changing nature of tariff policy suggests that this policy type has a
high capacity for partial-discriminatory application depending on what use those
in office decide to make of it and for what purpose.70. Ibid., 199.
71. Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory,”
World Politics 16 (1964): 677–715, at 691.
72. Ibid., 711.
73. Ibid., 701–04.
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ination in trade policy. Bloningen finds that the U.S. Department of Commerce
has enjoyed a wide scope for discretion in this policy area, despite the availability
of appeals courts and dispute settlement procedures available to investigated par-
ties, and even in the presence of general principles such as those provided by the
Uruguay Round Agreements and U.S. law.74 Other scholars have criticized the sub-
stantive and procedural requirements for the calculation of margin of dumping75
and export subsidization, and have identified a bias toward the identification of
higher margins and higher import duties.76 Hansen argues that this bias leads spe-
cific industries to seek protection when they think the U.S. International Trade
Commission is likely to grant them protection.77 Goldstein finds that the likelihood
that an industry which has filed an application to the commission will be granted
protection depends less on economic need andmore on the ability to apply political
pressure on decision makers.78
However, scholars have yet to link these applications of particularism and favor-
itism in trade policy to an agenda aiming at political coercion. Why political co-
ercion in economic life did not become predominant in the United States can be
explained by the structure of political power and interest-group competition in
U.S. politics. Mashaw describes how the early republic used much administrative
discretion for purposes of economic development and nation-building.79 This in-
volved tasks such as land distribution, currency management, and establishing
trade and transport infrastructure, which stood in dissonance with the ideology of
the time, which stressed limited national power and localism. Administrative struc-
tures were devised to address the demands for government throughout the Jeffer-
sonian and Jacksonian periods; these consisted of a localized and fragmented sys-
tem of administration subject to common law rules of accountability sanctioned by74. Bruce A. Blonigen, “Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Antidumping Activity,”
Canadian Journal of Economics 39 (2006): 874–900, at 875–78.
75. The latter is defined as the alleged difference between the foreign market value of a good
and its price in the U.S. market.
76. Richard Boltuck and Robert E. Litan, eds., Down in the Dumps: Administration of the
Unfair Trade Laws (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1991).
77. Wendy L. Hansen, “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protec-
tionism,” American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 21–46.
78. Judith Goldstein, “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection,” Ameri-
can Political Science Review 80 (1986): 161–84.
79. Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years
of American Administrative Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012), 82.
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178 | Hayek versus Trumpcourts. This was an evolving environment characterized by dispersed patterns of
bargaining between state governments and different national agencies under the
shadow of possible judicial remedies.
Hayek’s warning about a central authority assuming widespread planning power
over the whole of society does not apply to decentralized bargaining over specific
administrative outcomes. Instead, early American state building evolved into what
Dahl describes as a pluralist stage in U.S. politics. Dahl describes American interest
group politics as consisting of fields for competition, mostly in local settings, in
which each policy creates and invites a separate group of stakeholders: “. . . the vast
apparatus that grew up to administer the affairs of the American welfare state is a
decentralized bargaining bureaucracy.”80 McCormick adds that experimentation
with bureaucratic planning in sectors such as transport and infrastructure was ul-
timately captured by rivalry among sectors and interest group competition.81 The
decentralized nature of competition for favorable policies across different eco-
nomic sectors has given shape to the United States’ arena of particularistic poli-
tics, which so far has avoided a single political force coming to hold sway over a
wide range of economic sectors.
There is an important distinction between particularistic politics as a general-
ized practice in liberal democracies82 and a widespread application of partial-
discriminatory politics that takes the form of command-and-control management.
Protectionist trade policy poses a heightened risk for partial-discriminatory treat-
ment, but such risk may not materialize in the absence of a political agency willing
to unleash the coercive capacity of the policy tools it has available and in the ab-
sence of political and ideological conditions enabling it to do so. Refining Dahl’s
analysis by pointing out that policy outcomes are not merely the result of group
conflict, Lowi notes that “the relations among the interests and between them and
government vary, and the nature of and conditions for this variation are what
our political analyses should be concerned with.”83 In turn, Arnold makes the im-
portant observation that members of Congress have some degree of autonomy80. Robert A Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1956), 145.
81. Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the
Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 209–12.
82. John W. Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, 3rd ed. (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1989), 35–38; and Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves, “The Influence of
Federal Spending on Presidential Elections,” American Political Science Review 106 (2012):
348–66, at 350–51.
83. Lowi, “American Business,” 709 (see note 71 above).
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omy when it is in their electoral interest to do so.84
The question, therefore, is which political force has the agenda and the ideol-
ogy to support such a shift in power relations from particularistic politics towards
partial-discriminatory politics. The ideology would need to be tailored to justify a
command-and-control modality of policy making and implementation on a large
scale. Not all political ideologies offer a justification that would allow a political
force to change the character of economic policy and transform the economic struc-
ture into an overarching discriminatory regime.
Hayek and the Radical Right
We come to our final question. Does the radical right pose such a threat to lib-
erty? We are concerned with the degree to which its economic agenda can create
an economic structure enabling command-and-control applications that resemble
Hayek’s central planning decisions.
The radical right refers to a range of political movements and parties charac-
terized by a combination of populism, ethno-nationalism, and authoritarianism.85
Populism describes a discourse or thin ideology that claims there is an inherently
antagonistic relationship between “the people” and “the elites,”86 with the latter
attacked as corrupt and the former venerated as the legitimate source of political
power.87 Authoritarianism describes the preference of the radical right for security
and strong authority, its attacks on political pluralism, and its reference to the will
of the people as justifying political power with little regard to formal procedures
and institutional checks.88 Nationalism refers to the fundamental ideological posi-
tion of radical right parties that the nation takes normative precedence over all
other values: democracy, pluralism, an autonomous civil society, and personal and84. R. Douglas Arnold, Logic of Congressional Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1992), 4.
85. Bart Bonikowski, “Ethno-Nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of Collective Re-
sentment,” British Journal of Sociology 68 (2017): S181–S213; and Cas Mudde, Populist Radical
Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
86. Paris Aslanidis, “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective,” Polit-
ical Studies 64 (April 2016): 88–104, at 96; and Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Govern-
ment and Opposition 3 (2004): 542–63, at 545.
87. Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas, “Populism in Europe During Crisis: An Introduc-
tion,” in European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession, ed. Kriesi and Pappas (Colchester,
U.K.: ECPR Press, 2016), 1–19, at 4.
88. Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2000), 255.
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est, which radical right parties claim they authentically represent.While specific rad-
ical right parties and movements have adopted diverse interpretations of what the
“national interest” is, they concur on an ideology characterized by hostility to im-
migration and multiculturalism, populist opposition to what they see as “glob-
alist” elites and global institutions, and a preference for assertive and charismatic
leadership to transform the economic and political status quo by means of decisive
commands.
The economic agenda of the radical right is an extension of political nationalism
in the sphere of economic policy. While most radical right parties rhetorically ac-
knowledge what can be broadly described as a neoliberal ethos—supporting fiscal
stability, currency stability, and a reduction of government regulation—they put
forward a prominent agenda for economic protectionism that justifies departures
from neoliberal postulates regarding thinner and uniform regulations and gener-
ally lower spending.89 These departures are justified as serving the national interest,
which takes precedence over any other set of values and considerations, such as in-
dividual freedom, social justice, gender equality, class solidarity, or environmental
protection, which may drive economic policy in other political parties. Rather than
a principled stance on government intervention along the traditional left-right spec-
trum, the radical right’s economic agenda can be described as mixing nativist, pop-
ulist, and authoritarian features.90 It seemingly respects property and professes a
commitment to economic liberty, but it subordinates economic policy to the ideal
of national sovereignty.
An example of a radical right party is the Front National in France, which has
an agenda critical of global capitalism and has proposed measures such as re-
establishing import tariffs and other border controls, the re-nationalization of ag-
ricultural policy, taking control of tax policies from the European Union, and state
control and responsibility for the prices of essential goods.91 To justify a range of89. Alexandre Afonso, “Whose Interests Do Radical Right Parties Really Represent? The
Migration Policy Agenda of the Swiss People’s Party between Nativism and Neoliberalism,”
in The Discourses and Politics of Migration in Europe, ed. Umut Korkut et al. (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2013), 17–35, at 21; and Leonce Röth, Alexandre Afonso, and Dennis C. Spies,
“The Impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on Socio-economic Policies,” European Political
Science Review 10 (2018): 325–50.
90. Simon Otjes et al., “It’s Not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political
Economy of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties,” Swiss Political Science Review 24 (2018):
270–90, at 273.
91. Daniel Stockemer and Abdelkarim Amengay, “The Voters of the FN under Jean-Marie
Le Pen and Marine Le Pen: Continuity or Change?,” French Politics 13 (2015): 370–90, at 376;
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ence” and has inextricably linked it with the notion of national sovereignty. Like-
wise, the Freedom Party in Austria has emphasized national control, particularly
over the movement of labor, and a commitment to protect Austrian workers against
immigrants. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany has adopted an agenda pro-
posing re-establishing national control over the economy against supranational in-
stitutions.92 In the United States, President Trump has emerged to lead a radical fac-
tion from inside the traditional right-wing Republican Party on a strident platform
opposing immigration, global institutions, and current international trade arrange-
ments, which he has portrayed as antagonistic to American economic interests.93
The key question is whether this type of agenda can unleash a wider wave of
partial-discriminatory state interventions. Is economic nationalism likely to in-
clude the type of command-and-control economic policies that we fear as coercive?
Economic nationalism can be applied through tariffs, import quotas, and immigra-
tion restrictions, all justified by appeals to the “national interest.” This approach to
economic management allows authorities to treat property as an object of admin-
istration in a way similar to the directions of private activity that Hayek feared
would take place in the pursuit of “social justice.”94 It can take the form of dis-
criminatory decisions and commands that have a capacity to coerce even though
their authorization may come from generally worded rules. Protectionism can be
effectuated by expedient decisions and flexible discretion in the selection of bene-
ficiaries and the exclusion of others; hence it entails a strong potential for discrim-
ination. The government will enjoy wide discretion in identifying the sectors of the
economy or even particular companies that enjoy such a protection, such as na-
tional champions that need to be strengthened and weaker industries that need
to be protected. The radical right potentially could exploit protectionism’s highest
capacity for partial-discriminatory applications.and Gilles Ivaldi, “Towards the Median Economic Crisis Voter? The New Leftist Economic
Agenda of the Front National in France,” French Politics 13 (2015): 346–69, at 358.
92. Kai Arzheimer, “The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party
for Germany?,” West European Politics 38 (2015): 535–56, at 545–46.
93. Matthew C. MacWilliams, “Who Decides When the Party Doesn’t? Authoritarian Vot-
ers and the Rise of Donald Trump,” PS: Political Science & Politics 49 (2016): 716–21, at 717;
and Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The
Silent Revolution in Reverse,” Perspectives on Politics 15 (2017): 443–54, at 446.
94. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 142 (see note 8 above); indeed, Hayek saw twentieth-
century nationalisms as partly motivated by an underlying desire for social justice among their
adherents, at 134 (see note 8 above).
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182 | Hayek versus TrumpThe political rhetoric of the radical right and their political tactics suggest that
this development is possible. The radical right has employed tactics of attacking
opponents as unpatriotic and scapegoating them for any failures the nation has suf-
fered. Its attitude suggests that the kind of economic nationalism and protection-
ism that it prefers would likely be arbitrary, ad hoc, and applied to manipulate eco-
nomic and political behavior. This is perhaps most tragically demonstrated in the
case of immigration restrictions and deportation practices. These may appear to
coerce exclusively foreign residents, but ultimately they harm citizens who are un-
able to prove their status and citizens who choose to associate with foreign nationals.95
Evidence of the discretionary features of this agenda can be found in Trump’s
tactics of targeting some businesses while accommodating others in his personal
circle of special interests.96 In April 2017, Trump ordered a comprehensive review
of steel imports with an eye to adopting protectionist measures, invoking “national
security” as the criterion upon which he would base his judgment, on the basis of a
rarely used law, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.97 Trump vowed to
impose tariffs ranging from 15% to 35% to protect American jobs. This gave him
leverage over sectors and specific firms, illustrated by his threat to impose a tariff on
the Ford Motor Company in retaliation for outsourcing some factory jobs.98 Like-
wise, Trump’s deal with United Technologies regarding its Carrier Corporation
brand, providing tax incentives in order to save approximately a thousand jobs in
Indiana, could set a precedent that reshapes the relationship between government
and business.99 Trump has also criticized Apple Inc.’s policy on encryption and its
reliance on China for its international production.100
In addition, in March 2018, Trump gathered steel and aluminum industry rep-
resentatives to gauge their views and to show that his decisions would depend on95. Chandran Kukathas, “On David Miller on Immigration Control,” Critical Review of In-
ternational Social and Political Philosophy 20 (2017): 712–18, at 716.
96. Nicholas Fandos, “Corporations Open the Cash Spigot for Trump’s Inauguration,”New York
Times, January 15, 2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/us/politics/trump-inauguration
-donations-corporations.html.
97. Mark Landler, “Trump Roars Again on Trade, Reviewing Steel and Chiding Canada,”
New York Times, April 20, 2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/business/trade-canada
-trump-steel.html?ref5business&_r50.
98. Kirsten Korosec, “Trump Targets Ford Ahead of Michigan Primary,” Fortune, March 7,
2016, at https://fortune.com/2016/03/07/trump-targets-ford-michigan-primary/.
99. “Read Donald Trump’s Remarks at Carrier Plant in Indiana,” Time, December 1, 2016,
at https://time.com/4588349/donald-trump-carrier-jobs-speech/.
100. Lindsey J. Smith, “Donald Trump on Apple Encryption Battle: ‘Who Do They Think
They Are?,’ ” Verge, February 17, 2016, at https://www.theverge.com/2016/2/17/11031910
/donald-trump-apple-encryption-backdoor-statement.
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Aris Trantidis and Nick Cowen | 183personal interactions.101 Trump presents himself as a dealmaker-in-chief. His pro-
fessed style of government is that of a business manager, which involves fixing
things:
Congress . . . has been deadlocked for years and [is] virtually unable to deal
with any of our most pressing domestic problems, or even the most basic
ones, such as passing a budget. Think of it: a little thing like passing the bud-
get. They don’t even have a clue.102
Finally, I realized that America doesn’t need more “all talk, no-action” pol-
iticians running things. It needs smart businesspeople who understand how
to manage. We don’t need more political rhetoric—we need more common
sense. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”—but if it is broke, let’s stop talking about
it and fix it. I know how to fix it.103
Trump presents his economic policy as flexible management in which the choice of
the target for sanction or subsidy is driven by the pursuit of the national interest. In
this light, it is plausible that the radical right can introduce an economic regime
which, by virtue of its greater capacity for discretionary—and, therefore, discrim-
inatory—application offers sufficient scope for coercive interventions in the sense
that individual winners and losers can be identified ex ante and actors are given a
choice between political loyalty rewarded with benefits, or retaliation in the form of
economic penalties with the specific target already in mind.
Finally, the dynamics of such a discriminatory system exhibit similarities with
the terms of the Hayekian analysis. For Hayek, the tendency for further expansion
of government control over the economy simultaneously exacerbates distribu-
tional conflicts and leads to a fully planned economy. Unless societies opt for a re-
turn to competition, this will unleash a popular cry for a strongman to deliver more
effective and comprehensive planning. Once an economic system of centralized
command is established, it will easily degenerate into authoritarianism.104 The path101. “Remarks by President Trump in Listening Session with Representatives from the Steel
and Aluminum Industry,” March 1, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements
/remarks-president-trump-listening-session-representatives-steel-aluminum-industry/.
102. Donald Trump, Crippled America: How to Make America Great Again (New York:
Threshold Editions, 2015), xiii.
103. Ibid, 4.
104. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 107 (see note 1 above).
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184 | Hayek versus Trumpto economic dictatorship would involve “further agreement that planning is nec-
essary” and “stronger demands that the government or some single individual
should be given powers to act on their own responsibility.”105
Competition for privilege under such a protectionist system makes it less likely
that the level of discriminatory interventions will remain stable. Given the nature of
economic protectionism as a structure for partial-discriminatory interventions, the
allocation of privileges and sanctions is susceptible to clientelist exchange, namely
“the proffering ofmaterial goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion
of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?”106 Ad
hoc protectionist decisions favoring a specific industry or company create incen-
tives for actors to engage in rent seeking and for the government to exercise further
discretion.107 Protectionist policies can culminate in trade disputes and trade wars,
in which the results of retaliation further expand the government’s scope for dis-
cretion. Countervailing duties and measures during a trade war are also at the dis-
cretion of national governments. The operation of this system is likely to intensify
distributional tensions, due to the inchoate aims it seeks to achieve, potentially
leading to an economic system ridden with conflicts over the personalized alloca-
tion of government privilege.
For this reason, it is alarming to observe Trump attacking what he sees as “un-
fair trade practices” and risking the onset of trade wars that increase uncertainty
about “worrisome” remedies and methods that can be at his disposal.108 They can
involve a wider use of ad hoc applications of protectionism, threatening to over-
turn long-standing rules in a way that broadens the scope of threats and generates
calls for retaliation. All of this bestows on the president more power and oppor-
tunities for partial-discriminatory decisions. Handley and Limão point out that “re-
opening any agreement would replace a system built on long term policy commit-
ments with a regime where commitments change with the preferences of each newly
elected government.”109 This bolsters an agenda that asserts that a strong and central-
ized political authority should assume the responsibility of effectively managing this105. Ibid., 108.
106. Susan Carol Stokes, “Political Clientelism,” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Pol-
itics, ed. Carles Boix and Susan Carol Stokes (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2007),
604–05.
107. Gordon Tullock, The Rent-Seeking Society (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 2005), 9–
10.
108. Kyle Handley and Nuno Limão, “Trade under T.R.U.M.P. Policies,” in Economics and
Policy in the Age of Trump, ed. Chad P. Bown (London: CEPR Press, 2017), 141–52, at 142–43.
109. Ibid., 149.
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Aris Trantidis and Nick Cowen | 185system in a logic similar to that described in Serfdom.110 Competition for government-
granted protection is likely to expand the scope for favors and sanctions and re-
duce the space where economic actors can find refuge from partial-discriminatory
interventions.
Such an economic agenda, by the nature of the type of applications it requires, is
more likely to alter the economic structure to that of an “an attenuated property
rights system”111 and to forge a system that will sustain society’s dependence on po-
litical authority. In such circumstances, the same mechanisms that currently en-
sure that the bureaucracy is aligned with the elected government’s political goals
will be used to impose partial-discriminatory treatment justified in the name of
the national interest.112 It is then possible to envisage a political authority posi-
tioned to identify winners, reward them in return for their loyalty, and threaten dis-
senters with exclusion and discrimination. This state of affairs can become so dom-
inant that it eliminates exit for economic actors to spheres of economic activity
relatively protected from partial-discriminatory interventions.
If partial-discriminatory allocations become typical, economic actors may find
it impossible to operate outside the reach of the politicized economy and to avoid
the exercise of coercion that it entails.113 At that point, partial-discriminatory inter-
ventions generate not simply a state-controlled economy, but a politically controlled
society where economic actors can be identified, targeted, rewarded, or discrimi-
nated against on political grounds. If the allocation of opportunities is system-
atically controlled by a single political force that determines how the government
distributes resources,114 social groups find themselves tied into a relationship of110. See also Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (see note 49 above).
111. Boettke, “On Reading Hayek,” 1048 (see note 19 above).
112. Mathew Mccubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Proce-
dures as Instruments of Political Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (1987):
243–77; B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, “The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy,” American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 801–28; Terry M. Moe, “Control and
Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,” American Political Science Review
79 (1985): 1094–1116; and Richard P. Nathan, The Administrative Presidency (New York: Mac-
Millan, 1983), 81.
113. Aris Trantidis, “Clientelism and the Classification of Dominant Party Systems,” De-
mocratization 22 (2015): 113–33, at 126.
114. Kenneth F. Greene, “A Resource-Theory of Single-Party Dominance: The PRI in Mex-
ico,” in Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases, and Compari-
sons, ed. Matthijs Bogaards and Françoise Boucek (New York: Routledge, 2010), 155–74; Steven
Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10; Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic
Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 9; Luis
FernandoMedina and Susan Carol Stokes, “Monopoly andMonitoring: An Approach to Political
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186 | Hayek versus Trumpdependency which, instead of violence, uses partial-discriminatory allocations as
socioeconomic sanctions that force citizens to show political loyalty and to abstain
from strong demonstrations of dissent.115
Conclusion
Drawing fromHayek’s notion of coercion, we have offered an extension of Hayek’s
argument about the relationship between economic structure and political liberty.
Hayek does not make a gloomy prediction about the democratic prospects of
mixed economies, nor does he solely warn about socialist planning. Instead, his ac-
count of coercion in Constitution offers the basis for a refined argument about
which institutional settings pose a potential threat to liberty. Our institutional ar-
gument is based on the combined effect of economic commands as incursions into
the sphere of personal freedoms (private property and economic freedom), the pres-
ence of an authority that applies discretionary economic power (an economic dic-
tator), and the consequences of that system for personal and political liberty.
We then examined the radical right’s agenda in order to answer the question of
whether its policy agenda is likely to expose citizens to the kind of arbitrary power
that Hayek warns us against inConstitution and Serfdom. Is the radical right’s pref-
erence for economic nationalism and protectionism a threat in light of Hayek’s
writings?
Our analysis in the section on “Impersonal and Partial-Discriminatory Inter-
vention” develops Hayek’s notions of coercion and personal liberty in Constitution.
Partial-discriminatory interventions allow for ex ante identification of individuals
and ad hoc discrimination that can become politically coercive even if the rule
underpinning it appears to be general. On that basis, we extend Hayek’s political
thought. First, we emphasize the capacity for the actual application of rules and
policies in a coercive manner, and less so the typical form of the rule itself. Al-
though form and applicability are interrelated, general rules of conduct can be-
come coercive at the stage of implementation and enforcement. Second, we argue
that the mere appeal to social justice will not necessarily lead to coercive applica-
tions of state power, despite the conflicts that various policies invoking social justiceClientelism,” in Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Politi-
cal Competition, ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), 68–83, at 69; and Aris Trantidis, “Reforms and Collective Action in a Clientelist
System: Greece during the Mitsotakis Administration (1990–93),” South European Society and
Politics 19 (2014): 215–34, at 216.
115. See Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1971), 49.
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Aris Trantidis and Nick Cowen | 187may generate. Ideologies invoking the concept of social justice have driven the de-
velopment of welfare systems, but these systems have largely implemented
impersonal entitlements that do not readily facilitate personal and discretionary
allocations.
By contrast, the radical right’s combined political and economic agenda gener-
ates an increased risk of coercion as understood byHayek. The Radical Right brings
an ideology that encourages discretionary policies on a large scale under a system of
protections and subsidies controlled by a single agency (in the U.S. case, the pres-
idency). This threatens to expose economic actors to the coercive power that Hayek
condemns in Constitution and to transform society into a rent-seeking economy
prone to authoritarian manipulation, as he describes in Serfdom.
The radical right’s nationalist agenda and political strategy can unlock a large
scope for partial-discriminatory treatment. It claims to represent a nation against
corrupt elites, and it reveres authority in a way that justifies a disregard for proce-
dural checks and permits partial-discriminatory applications of state power. The
radical right’s economic principle of the putative national interest is a specific, ex-
clusionary configuration of “social justice,” as Hayek would understand it, that elic-
its policies that increase the scope for government command of private activity.
Economic protectionism in the service of the “national interest” is governed by
rules that allow for a wider range of discretionary decisions justified by expediency.
Protectionism is ripe for discrimination with tariff policies, national subsidies, gov-
ernment contracts, and other financial instruments enough to cover most sections
of economic activity.
Partial-discriminatory policies could emerge from any branch of government,
depending on the institutions of each country. In the U.S. case, the executive can
exercise discretion through its control over bureaucratic departments. There are
reasons to be optimistic about the stability of democracy in the United States. It
has a large private sector and civil society, boisterous news media, and an indepen-
dent judiciary that frequently countermands executive commands. However, there
are reasons to be alarmed. Part of the radical right’s agenda is to control the Repub-
lican Party and build a network across formal institutional veto points, such as
Congress and the Supreme Court. It aims at control over the administration and
the removal of processes and norms that impede policies that they present to be
in the national interest.
The argument we put forward here is not mainly about a particular govern-
ment in which the radical right has gained power, but also about the institutional
infrastructure that the radical right can introduce into the economic system, pos-
sibly in subsequent rounds over time, which would enable those in power toThis content downloaded from 086.146.255.161 on June 11, 2020 02:45:54 AM
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188 | Hayek versus Trumpincrease their capacity for infringements on personal and political freedom. The
radical right’s ideology offers a nationalist line of defense for the establishment of
a far-reaching partial-discriminatory economic regime starting with government-
firm or government-industry agreements, the treatment of business in relation to
production, policies on imports and exports, and the treatment of immigrants and
their families. On the aggregate level, such an economic regime carries a higher risk
for increased levels of political coercion through practices that help the government
to reward loyalists and punish dissenters. Democracies can survive distributional
conflicts, withstand recurrent policy failure, and even endure the rise and fall of in-
dividual demagogues, but they can hardly survive a structure allowing large-scale
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